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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
DIVEFSIFIED GENERl1.L CORPORA1.'ION, ) 
a Utah corporation, ) 
) 
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) 
vs. ) 
) 
WHITE Bl~RN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a ) 
Utah corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,) 
ALBEFT SANOUE, A OK LANDS INCOR- ) 
PORATED, a Utah corporation, and ) 
JOHN DOES 1 through 8 in cl usi ve, ) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
District Court No. 67122 
Supreme Court No. 15462 
Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Second District Court for 
Weber County, State of utah 
THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, 
Presiding 
For the Plaintiff-Appellant 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
Attorneys at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1314 
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Attorneys at Law 
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Ogden, Utah 84401 
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OF THE 
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---0000000---
DIV£RSIFIED GEtlERAL CORPORATION, 
a Ul 'Lh corr;oration I 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC., a 
Uteth corpO:Ci'Ltion, KEITH B. DOWNS,) 
Jl.LBEWl' SMW~JE I A OK LAlWS INCOR- ) 
PORl\TED, a Utoh corporation, and ) 
JOB'~ DOES 1 through 8, inclusive,) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. 15462 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMEHT 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Appellant replies to Respondents' Brief as follows: 
POINT I 
R~SPONDENTS' COHCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO BROKER-
FilWER DJ S'i'INCTION IN UTAH COMES AS A RESULT 
OF RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE INTER-
ACTION OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES. 
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In their Brief, Respondents attempt to persuade the Court 
that the principal Utah cases bearing on the ~roker-findPr 1·" 
- ~sue, 
namely, Ander_s_on ':::'·Johnson, 108 Uto.h 417, lGO P.2d 725 (194S), 
and Chase v. Morcran, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P. 2d 1019 (1959), do not 
esto.blish or recognize a broker-finder distinction, and that the 
Washington courts have rejected California's longstanding 
recognition of that distinction. The reasoning of Respondents 
in support of those propositions suggests a failure to discern 
both of the important public policies viewed by this Court and 
others in resolving such cases. Once the interplay of these 
policies is understood o.nd seen as the backdrop to the decisi~s 
in these cases, it becomes clear that the finder-broker distincti 
exists in all three states mGntioned and it also becomes possiWs 
to spot the crucial facts which have caused the courts to 
decide that the broker-finder distinction does or does not app~ 
in a given case. 
In each case cited by both Appellants and Respondents, there 
is this basic factual similarity: The first party renders a 
valuable "finding" service to the second party for which, by agn 
ment, compensation is to be paid, but for which the second par~ 
refuses to pay because of a licensing statute which, the second 
party argues, requires the first party to be licensed before 
rendering such service and collecting a fcco or commission. 
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In each such case, therefore, the Court is faced with two 
com~ctlng policy considerations: First, the policy of enforcing 
licensing stalutcs enacted to protect the public, and second, 
the policy of enforcing valid contractual obligations. The 
question then is 11hat test doe?s the Court use to determine 
preference for one or the other policy. This Court has stated 
that "in the absence of compelling considerations of policy to 
the contrary, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the 
covenants which the parties have agreed to in their contract." 
Lundstrom~· Radio Corporation of America, 17 Ut 2d 114, 405 P.2d 
339. This means that in cases like the one at bar involving a 
"finder", the court will enforce the contract unless the policy 
of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling. The resolution 
of such cases, therefore, boils down to a determination of when 
the policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling. 
The cases cited by both Appellant and Respondent establish 
clearly that enforcement of the broker's statutes is compelling 
only wh0re the party rendering the "finder's" service has had 
ilie authority to do more, or has actually done more, than find 
and introduce; conversely, where such party has done nothing more 
than find and introduce and has not had authority to do any more 
ilian that, the courts have allowed recovery on the basis that the 
dem0nds of the broker's statutes were not compelling and thus 
-3-
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contract policy considerations prevail. 
The reasoning implicit in the foregoing tesl is that where 
the party is truly a "finder" only, his infhK~ncE' is so remote 
and the potential dangcr to the public so small that the need 
for enforcing the licensing statute is not compelling and the 
policy of enforcing valid contracts, therefore, prevails. Such 
reasoning is sound and yields justice. An even casual reading o'. 
the licensing requirements of the broker's statutes makes it 
clear that they are designed to secure the competence and charact, 
of those who earn a fee or commission for reprcsc'ntinq and neg~­
tiating for the parties in oftentimes complicated real estate 
transactions. Clearly one who does no more than find and intro-
duce such parties need have no expertise in financial or real 
estate matters and the opportunity for dishonest dealing will 
seldom, if ever, present itself. Rather, it is where: one furnis;., 
analysis, discusses and negotiates terms and counsels the parties 
on methods of transacting the sale, arranges the financing a~ 
documentation, and uses the skills of salesmanship to convince 
the parties to consummate the deal, or where the party is 
authorized to do any of the foregoing, that his competence ~d 
character must be assured. The broker's statutes were designed 
to give such assurances, but not to work unjust enrichment wbere 
such assurance is unnecessary. The broker's statutes restrict 
-4-
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the freedom of the State's citizens to transact business with one 
another and should not, therefore, be extended beyond that coverage 
necessary to afford the protection for which they were designed; 
~ do so is to cause citizens to lose respect for the law and 
the courts and to nullify the good intentions of the legislature. 
In ~2dersen, the court granted recovery to the appellant and 
specificully stated that he could not reasonably be viewed as 
having purticipated in the negotiation of the transaction. Supr~, 
at 729. The real importance of Ander~i::~, however, is the con-
curring opinion of Justice Wade in which he carefully points out 
why the policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is not compelling 
in that CCise: 
A reading of the statutes regulating real 
estate brokers makes it apparent that they were enacted 
for the benefit of the public to protect them from 
dishonest and unscrupulous real estate agents. Such 
protection of the public is not needed from the casual 
or remote influence of a stenographer or of a person 
who r1k1y wish to deal with him. Neither the steno-
grapfrernorthe man who introduces the broker in the 
examples I have mentioned are active participants in 
any contract affecting real estate or any liability of 
the persons entering into such contracts or listings. 
The-de:l-llnqs which the statutes aim to protect the 
publJ_c 1n are those which result in legal liabilities 
between the parties. Nothing the stenographer or the 
rnan\·/h0 introduces the real ('State broker does I has 
thate-tfcct. This is true even though the real estate 
broker-contracts to pay the man wh~ introduces him a 
part of his commission in the event he makes a sale. 
(emphasis added) . 
~~ :':'._· Johnson, supra at 729-30. 
-5-
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In Chase, the second major Utah casC' in which Justice Wade 
writes for the majority and in harmony with his prior opinion 
in l\ndersen, the Court found that the appellant lwd been author-
in Chase was given authority by his prlncjpal to actually sell 
or negotiate the sale of the leases involved. 
It is clear fr0m the above evidence thilt appellant 
and his associates were authorized to sell or negotiate 
the sale of the leases involved. Such an aqrccmcnt 
contemplo.ted rr,ore tlian th2 mere findTn(;--or-.lntrocfoction 
~-~-bu11 ~:_!_ an~ cle_2:1._i:-_~~--yz,s ti-lc-;-_::~o-rt ?T act-i~v1 t)~-~e-;;;:;r;,ced 
within the def ini_!ic·:1 of "Rea 1 Esto.te-JJroJ~" --q-~otc_J __ 
above. (emphasis added) -
Chas~~· ~organ, supra at 1021. 
Respondents in the case at bar have tried to minimiZE~ the 
clarity of the foregoing languo.ge of the court in Chase with the 
assertion that the authority of negotiation and sale held by 
appellant in Chase wo.s simply an additional ground for bringing 
appellant within the ambit of the statute. However, a reading 
of the plain language of Chase makes that contention untenable. 
Respondents also seize upon the following language from 
Chase in an attempt to escape the clear meaning of the case: 
Appellant contends the court erred in concluding 
that he was precluded from recovery h2cause he had 
not obtained a real estate broker's license bec2use (1) 
the real estate broker's statutes do not il[)ply to one 
W110Tnerely intrndUccs a buyer toan-u;::;;:;-,:;-r;a-i1d(TJnor 
to transactions in the oiland gas-bt1sl11css; and (3) 
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because oil and gas leases are not real estate. We 
fincl no mer j t to any of these contentions. (emphasis 
adc1C::-rT) • 
~.£. ~· Mor,_si_an, supra at 1020. 
Respondent insists that the foregoing passage demonstrates 
the court's rejection of the broker-finder distinction; however, 
Respondent's interpretation cannot be made to square with Chase 
as a whole! nor with Justice lvade 's comments in Andersen. The 
obvious reason why the court found no merit in appellant's first 
contention is because appellant was authorized to do more than 
find and introduce a buyer. To restate the test: if one does not 
have authority to do any more than find and introduce and does 
not actually do more than that, enforcement of the broker's 
statutes is not compelling and the policy of enforcing valid 
contracts is favored. On the other hand, where a party has 
authority to negotiate or sell, i.e. do more than find and intro-
duce, or where the party actually does negotiate or sell, the 
policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling and must 
prevc:il. 
This test is precisely that which has been long espoused 
by the California courts: 
Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the 
competing public policies the finder's exception is 
not anomalous. Fundamental to our 'law is the basic 
principle that persons should perform their contracts, 
and when they breach their agreements, action should 
ordinarily lie to enforce contractual duties. On the 
-7-
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c;ithcr hand, the prornot ion of cc;r.1pctcncy and intcgri tv 
in thos~' cal led upon !Jy. the public to perform co::ipl c~ 
duties involv1 ng trust is a c:alutary puq•ose, ilnd 
the policy undcrly:[n<J tl1c! licensing statulcs n1ust l_)c 
given full effect. Nc~,_lhc_:_r_C_<:)_r1c,idc'r,-ihon:~ ol cornpc-
tency nor of trust aro.' of :i r.11_)ort :-J),-:z;-\:~)=(:---fr;;-;---1)])i~.'r­
t.:1bn~i s rne-rci}~ to ·--;:-;e:·c-:,-k-o\i c;·-1 ()ca i c-;-f:-fr1 Cf3]1'.f-_]_]]t ro-
d uce il buy0r, sel 1 cJr, l>eirr0\::c:-r-:--Ci1:-lc·11(1;.1:---t;_)-11Ts __ _ 
~~~l~~f:~!-~;~:;~1~~{~21~-f~-gM,~~l-~-1~~~ 1 ,~~~c~;~,~T,f:-~~-;~~ ls. 
By e__r::f:orcin_':l the pror:t:Lsc~ to--jiay -;_-)-f}]\(J81-=-•c;-foc~-~--
9JVC ctt cc t -t:ot=_}\c ]J-01.lc y-·;-T0n:=-o-1: c 01:~~_,n;: c1Tcc)n t 1 acts 
in cases where the pol ic-yl1nder1·;:--imr-thc~l-ic;::l;:~1:-;,~l-­
stattl.tedoes not d~~~t1·,-::--,:;pplL_:-TC::-rr1pl1ilsis -ad~~le-2n' 
Tyrone v. Kel;i,_ey, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65, at 72 (1973). 
POINT II 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH AND CALIFOENIA 
BROKER'S ST~TUTES REPUDIATES RESPONDE~TS' 
ARGUMENT THNr 'I'HEJ\E lUill RELEVANT ANLJ CR\JCIJ,L 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM. 
Respondents attempt to lessen the cogency of the Californic, 
cases by asserting incredibly that there is a substantial diffrn 
between the California and Utah broker's statutes. Appellant 
submits that the language of the respective stotutes speak 
plainly for the conclusion that the statutes are in effect 
virtually identical (see page 7 of Respondent's Brief). 
POINT III 
THE CASE WHICH RESPONDENTS RELY ON SO HEAVILY 
ACTUALLY CORROBORATES THE POSI'l'Irnl Tl,KE;'l !3Y 
APPELLANT. 
-8-
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As final support for its position, Appellant would draw the 
court's all~ntlon to the very case which Respondents so emphati-
cally point to in support of their position; namely, the Washington 
case of s;E;<~11rn~_r:_ ~- Skagit ValJ_c:_y_ Lumber Co., 162 Washington 677, 
P.37G (1931). With this case Respondents wish to convince the 
court that the other states have repudiated the California rule 
that fjJtdci-s arc an exception to the broker's statutes. (It is 
remarked that Respondents directly admit that California allows 
for find5ra and finder's fees. "The California statute and the 
Californiu c2se law allow for finder's fees." Page 7 of Respon-
dents' Brief. 
In citing the Granuner case, counsel for Respondents writes 
as follO\·IS: 
Tlw Supreme Court (in Grammer) listened to and 
repudiated all of the arguments proposed by counsel in 
this case. In determining if the salesman in that 
cuse WJS acting as a broker, or could avoid the conse-
quences of the broker law by being a finder, the court 
held the finder-broker distinction did not lie and the 
activities covered in the case were that of a broker. 
ResµoncJents' Brief, page 8. 
Counsel is partially right and partially wrong. Counsel is 
right in slating that the court held that the finder-broker 
distinction did not lie in Grammer and that the activities of 
the appcl lant were that of a broker, but counsel is wrong in 
assurni TlCJ tlwt the \~ashington court repudiated the same arguments 
-9-
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propounded by Appellant in the case at bar: the issue and prin-
ciples of law are the same, but the activities of the appellant 
in Grammer and those of the l\ppcllant in the cu.so at bar were 
profoundly and significantly different. It is submithec\ that 
the l'ilashington court would recosrnizc the broker-finder distinct['. 
in a proper case and counsel for Rcsponden ts adrni ts that by 
implication in his statement. The u.ppellant in GranirnE!'.'.", however,, 
did not present such a case. The facts in that case, as found 
by the court, were that appellant had authorization to negotia~ 
and obtain offers, i.e. actuaJ.ly offer the property for sale 
subject only to final approval by the defendant-owner; further, 
appellant actually prepared the seller's property for presentaL: 
to prospective purchasers by compiling data and information, 
cruised the timber, prepared estimates of the costs of procuring, 
manufacturing and disposing of logs and lumber, obtained optioos ! 
on other timber and consummated the sale. In other words, the 
appellant was authorized to do and essentially did all that a 
broker does, being limited only by seller's right to subsequent!;' 
approve or reject the sale. It is no wonder that the Washington 
court decried appellant's description of himself as a "finder" -
he was no such thing. 
It is apparent that the facts in ~ra~•':E are not the same 
nor even similar to those in the case at bar whe~e Appellant 1'1 35 
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contractually limited to doing and actually did no more than 
find pot~ntiQl buyers and refer or introduce them to the 
Respondents, who thereupon presented the property, negotiated 
all terms and offers, and consummated the sale. 
CONCLUSION 
The case law in Utah, California and Washington is harmonious 
and establishes the finder exception where the purported finder 
has neither done nor been authorized to do more than simply find 
and introduce. 
In conclusion, Appellant urges the Court to consider the case 
law and the lack of compelling considerations for the application 
of the broker's statutes to Appellant, to be mindful of the great 
inequity and unjust enrichment which will result if Respondents 
are perrni tted to flaunt and evade their valid and otherwise 
binding contractual obligations, and to rule accordingly. 
DATED this~t/? day of March, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CEH'I'JFICi\Tl, OF l-11\ILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true ancl correct copy of 
the foregoing Appellant's Roply Brief to all of the named 
Defendants-Respondents by mailing the same to the office of 
Patterson, Phillips, Gri dlcy & Echard, attorney;: for Defendants-
Respondents, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah g4qo1, placing each 
copy in a properly addressed, postage prepaid envelope and 
depositing said envelope: in t11e Uni led States rn<eil this Y:Y« 
day of March, 1978. 
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